

NIO/Warning

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 8195-80

22 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 December 1980)

Poland:

1. There was general agreement that Kania won some breathing space at the 5 December Warsaw Pact Summit. At the same time the Polish leadership probably agreed to avoid a policy of continuing concessions toward Solidarity. The apparent recognition that Poland was close to the precipice of a Soviet intervention has imposed a new sobriety on Solidarity, the Party and the Church, and there should ensue at least a temporary period in which all three parties seek to avoid new confrontations. [REDACTED]

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2. It is unlikely that Moscow accepts as a long-term solution the existing status quo, i.e., a situation of virtual dual power, and a fragmentation and potential de-Leninization of the Party. Moscow will expect Kania to make progress in reversing the status quo by reconstituting the Party on Leninist norms, and in reconsolidating political authority in its hands. There have been no signs of a military stand-down, and the Soviets are likely to hold a posture of military readiness as a means of keeping pressure on the Polish regime. [REDACTED]

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3. Given their preferences, the Soviets would like to see the evisceration of Solidarity and the rapid and complete restoration of the Party's political authority. But in the interests of maintaining a modicum of political stability and avoiding intervention, Moscow is probably prepared to tolerate a Kania strategy of negotiation and maneuver, the eventual objective

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which is to limit and constrain Solidarity. Kania's freedom to maneuver, however, has been greatly narrowed, and he cannot be seen to make further major concessions. On the contrary, we would expect to see emerge a policy of measured pressures against Solidarity and political dissidents. [REDACTED]

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4. The domestic situation remains volatile, and any major threat to political stability, such as nationwide strikes or food riots will be likely to elicit use of force by the regime, and possibly by the Soviets. Other persistent destabilizing features include possible food shortages, the evolving conservative/reformist struggle in the Party, the possibility of factionalism within the Solidarity leadership, and indiscipline in the union movement generally. [REDACTED]

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Does the Enhancement of Soviet Force Posture Post a Risk for NATO?

5. [REDACTED]

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Analysts also doubted that a Soviet military intervention in Poland would set in motion an escalating crisis which would pose a military threat to NATO. At the same time, attention was called to the possibility of armed struggle in Poland subsequent to a Soviet invasion which could evoke sympathy in the West and elicit calls for Western military assistance. [REDACTED]

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Post-Election Soviet Views of US/Soviet Relations:

6. The Soviets portrayed President Carter's electoral defeat as the result of failed domestic policies and his generally anti-Soviet course. While analysts believe that the Soviets are not anticipating an early policy of renewed cooperation on the part of the Reagan administration, they have [REDACTED] signaled their readiness to begin discussions on the future course of bilateral relations. At this point, Moscow's approach seems limited to avoiding an early, gratuitous souring of relations and a willingness to resume a dialogue, including exploration of the possibility of arms control negotiations. These efforts are reflected in Moscow's bilateral approaches to the West Europeans in which they have urged them to urge Washington to continue TNF talks at an early date. [REDACTED]

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A Possible Immediate Test of the New Administration:

7. Analysts agreed that there was no apparent "test" in sight, and that Moscow's desire to establish a dialogue with the Reagan administration would tend to preclude early foreign policy challenges to Washington which would have the effect of prejudicing the bilateral relationship from the outset. At the same time, while there may be no dramatic test of the new Administration, the Soviets will do nothing to restrain present policies in the Caribbean, Mideast, and Afghanistan which are essentially inimical to American interests, and which contribute to US-Soviet tensions. [REDACTED]

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